Over the first half of the 19 th century, the Prussian-German Customs Union known as the Zollverein gradually unified a scattered confederation of sovereign states under an internal free trade agreement. This paper uses grain prices to quantify the differential effect of the Zollverein for market integration among Zollverein members versus European powers that were not part of the Zollverein, including France, Switzerland, and the Habsburg Empire of Austria. Overall, this border effect is consistently and substantially less than border effect estimates from contemporary samples. For the 1834 liberalization round, the implied border effect, calculated as the implied decrease in distance that comes about as the result of the customs border being eliminated, is between 140 and 160 kilometers, with the smaller distance for non-German speaking cities, and the larger distance for German speaking cities. Thus, common language in this sample provides an additional benefit of lowering trade barriers by 11-15% in distance, making border elimination more valuable among German-speaking cities than for mixedlanguage-speaking cities. The paper offers a few reasons for why I estimate smaller border effects than are found in studies on 20 th century economies, and the analysis gives a new historical perspective on what drives trade costs and changes in market integration.
Introduction
Over the first half of the 19 th century, the Prussian-German Customs Union known as the German Zollverein gradually unified a scattered confederation of sovereign states under an internal free trade agreement. According to Jacob Viner, "the German Zollverein was the pioneer and by far the most important customs union, and generalizations about the origin, nature, and consequences of unification of tariffs tend to be based mainly or wholly on the German experience." The measure of the border effect has been used in numerous contemporary studies to capture the notion that political borders lead to international price dispersion. Typically, the price dispersion of a similarly traded good is larger across different countries relative to an equal distance within borders, and the measure of how much more can be attributed to the additional transactions costs of crossing the border (Feenstra 2004, 151) . The factors behind the widely documented border effect are numerous, and could include tariffs or non-tariff barriers, exchange rate variability, nominal price stickiness, unit-shipping costs, and differences in culture and language, among other sources. 4 Significantly, existing estimates suggests that international border effects are large (McCallum 1995 , Engel and Rogers 1996 , Parsley and Wei 1996 , Helliwell and Verdier 3 Viner (1950 . 4 Evans (2003) , e.g., evaluates some of the sources of the border effect.
2001). Engel and Rogers (1996) , for example, show in a late 20 th century sample that crossing the United States and Canadian border has the equivalent effect on price volatility as adding 1,780 miles (or 2,848 kilometers) between cities within national borders, a result that implies transporting a good between cities located directly across the U.S.-Canadian border is as difficult as carrying it between Boston and Houston. What is striking about the estimate is that the effects are so substantial even between countries that share a common language, similar legal systems, market institutions, and where formal trade barriers have been lowered under the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Between countries such as the U.S. and Japan, Parsley and Wei (2001) calculate that the "border" is equivalent to 43,000 trillion miles. What estimates on border effects might we expect to find in a historical sample where trade barriers tended to be much higher and international markets more segmented? If studies based on today's economies are any guide, one might expect that in times past border effects placed only greater constraints on trade opportunities.
In order to assess the impact of borders in 19 th century Europe, and to provide a comparison of that to the importance of borders today, this paper examines how national borders affected the process of European integration during the critical years of its economic development from 1815 to 1855. I use grain prices to quantify the differential effect of the Zollverein for market integration among Zollverein members versus European powers that were not part of the Zollverein, including France, Switzerland, and the Habsburg Empire of Austria.
If price dispersion was driven by the presence of trade barriers, customs houses, and official borders before the Zollverein agreement, integration should increase when these factors are removed. In addition to estimating the border effect, I also use local indicators of spatial association (Anselin 1995) to assess relative market integration. Local Geary statistics allow us to take a spatial view of integration and to identify the specific locations where integration was relatively strong or relatively weak.
A comparison of 19 th century and contemporary border effects should provide a better understanding of their effects in history and on how borders may have affected long-run economic development paths. The study of the impact of border effects in history may also be helpful for arriving at a better understanding of trade costs today (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004) . This paper relates broadly to several other strands of the literature. One is the longstanding empirical research on the Law of One Price (LOP) or Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), the basis of which has been examined under a diverse set of contexts and for a variety of goods. Recent studies include Persson (1999) , Kopsidis (2002 Kopsidis ( , 1998 , Shiue (2003 Shiue ( , 2002 , Taylor (2002) , Findlay and O'Rourke (2003) , and Goldberg and Verboven (2003) . None of these studies, however, have measured the border effect in a historical setting. Second, since improved economic integration in the 19 th century might have had an impact on the scope of specialization and Germany's path towards industrialization, the findings also relate to the important topic of the implications of trade for growth. See for example, Bairoch (1989 Bairoch ( , 1972 on the history of European development and free trade, O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) on the impact of trade in goods and factors in the Atlantic Economy, and Frankel and Romer (1999) , Sachs and Warner (1995) , and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) on cross-country correlations between openness and growth in 20 th century.
The following section gives a brief overview of the political and economic conditions, starting before 1815. Section 3 discusses the data used in this paper. Section 4 presents the framework of analysis and empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Historical Overview
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In the 18 th century, Germany was divided into over three hundred states-Kingdoms, Electorates, Duchies, Imperial Cities, ecclesiastical territories, and other political administrative bodies-wherein the two major powers were the Habsburg Empire (Austria) and Prussia. 6 After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814/15, the French withdrew their expansion towards the East, and Germany's political structure became reorganized into the thirty-nine states of the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) (see Figure 1) . Austria was the most powerful of the German states in 1815, followed by Prussia, whose territories where separated into two parts. The Eastern part reached from the mouth of the Vistula River to the Harz mountains, and consisted of seven provinces. The Western part consisted of the Westphalia and the Rhineland provinces, and included the Rhine-Ruhr area that later was to become the industrial center of Germany.
The German states of moderate size included Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. There were also a number of independent (free) cities, such as Frankfurt.
Constitutionally, the German Confederation was a union of sovereign states in which joint action depended upon unanimity, and states sought to retain their independent status. Thus, even though the German Confederation had a parliament based in Frankfurt, its members would vote according to instructions from their respective governments. As of 1815, Germany still lacked the political unity that characterized the contemporary nation states of, for instance, France or Britain.
At the end of the 18 th century, German textile industries in Silesia, Saxony, and Münster, 5 See e.g. Hahn (1984) , Henderson (1939 Henderson ( , 1975 , Tilly (1966) , Kitchen (1978) , Lee (1988) , Dumke (1991 Dumke ( , 1977 , and Bazillion (1990) for additional background information. 6 Here, Germany refers to the outlines of the German Confederation of 1820; see Figure 1 . Figures 1-4 come from the server for digital historical maps at the Institut für Europäische Geschichte-Mainz (IEG), http://www.iegmaps.uni-mainz.de/.
were among the few industries that were flourishing, and this was due in part to the Continental Blockade system implemented under Napoleon that shut out British competition. Many German industries were still comparatively underdeveloped, and specialization was limited.
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Much of the raw materials consumed in Germany were also of domestic origin, and German states generally aimed for self-sufficiency. By contrast, industrialization had already begun in Britain, and Britain was also engaged to a greater extent in foreign trade.
It is plausible that internal German trade before the creation of the Zollverein in 1834 had been hampered by political fragmentation and by the fact that individual states tended to be quite protectionist. A shipper on the Main and Rhine rivers from Bamberg to Mainz (187 kilometers as the crow flies), or from Strassbourg to the Dutch frontier, had to pay more than thirty tolls.
Fourteen tolls were charged between Magdeburg and Hamburg on the Elbe. Furthermore, tariffs were complicated: Prussia, for example, imposed over 60 different rates of customs and excise (Henderson 1939, 22-23) . These tolls likely reduced internal German trade while encouraging smuggling: the size of the customs area was small relative to its customs border, making the enforcement of customs payment relatively costly on a per-capita (or, per square-mile) basis.
Moreover, the German states as a whole were not protected by a high common external tariff as was the case for other European countries. 8 Given the complexity of the tariff structure, and the frequency with which it changed, it is not surprising that there is no study that is based on a comprehensive measure of transportation costs. Henderson (1939, 10) , e.g. suggests that "the lack of effective political unity in Germany and the strength of the spirit of particularism in 1815 help to explain the economic backwardness of the country in comparison with Britain or France". See also Clapham (1936) . 8 In particular, the tariffs of some of the free cities and ports (Hamburg, Bremen, and Frankfurt) as well as those of states that depended highly on trade (e.g. Baden). 9 An interesting contribution along these lines is Ohnishi (1973) , who examines the tariff policy of Prussia between 1818 and 1834. At the same time, this study provides limited quantitative details, and moreover, Prussia is only one of several European states that I cover in the present study.
The Creation of the German Zollverein
Arguably, it was the onset of industrialization and economic growth that made it more costly to retain economic independence, leading to the creation of the German Zollverein. In the case of Germany, economic integration in fact preceded political integration. During the 19 th century, Austria and Prussia vied to become the dominant German power. Prussia prevailed in this contest, and the German Reich, a politically unified entity, was formed under Prussia's leadership in the year 1871.
Although the year usually given for the inception of the German Zollverein is 1834, in fact the elimination of internal customs barriers in Germany was a gradual process. Moreover, the Zollverein was not so much an agreement created among roughly equally powerful states, but it was rather the product of Prussian efforts to cast an increasingly wider customs union and to include more and more of the German states (ultimately, the only important exception was Austria).
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When the Prussian Customs Union was formed in the year 1818, Prussia did away with a multitude of national, provincial, local, and private dues in favor of a reasonably simple, unified, and relatively low tariff at its external frontiers. Other German states, notably Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, negotiated the formation of a customs union on their part, but initially without success. Then, in 1828, Hesse-Darmstadt decided to join the Prussian Customs Union. It adopted the Prussian external tariff and eliminated internal barriers to Prussia in exchange for a share of the customs revenue. In the same year, Bavaria and Württemberg formed the South German Customs Union, while a number of central German states and cities formed the Middle 10 On the German and Austrian relationship, see Katzenstein (1976) .
German Commercial Union (see Figure 2 ).
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The latter was not a customs union, but essentially a defensive agreement among members to commit to not joining either the Prussian/HesseDarmstadt or the South German Customs Union. Countries such as Britain and the Netherlands were eager to have low-tariff access to Frankfurt and Germany's South, and they supported the Middle German Commercial Union. Prussia, however, had become by that time far too important an economy to ignore and the other German states found they could not boycott the customs union for long. As the Middle German Commercial Union began to crumble, Hesse-Cassel became the first to join the Prussian Customs Union in 1831.
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In the year 1833, both the Thuringian states and the Kingdom of Saxony formed respective customs unions. All of these areas, together with the augmented Prussian Customs Union, became the German Zollverein on January 1 st , 1834. Further, the terms under which states joined the union were substantively the same. Three other German states joined the German Zollverein between mid-1835 and early 1836: Baden, Nassau, and the city of Frankfurt (see Figure 4 ). This connected Bavarian Palatinate, the part of Bavaria to the west of the Rhine, to Württemberg and the Bavarian core areas without customs border. The accession of Frankfurt was significant, first of all, because of 11 The states were Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Brunswick, Oldenburg, Frankfurt, Bremen, the Saxon duchies, and a couple of smaller ones. See Henderson (1939, 67) . 12 This was significant because it meant that the East and West Prussian provinces were joined without a customs border for the first time. It also meant that British goods could not reach Frankfurt and Germany's south anymore without crossing the Prussian external tariff border; see Figure 1 . 13 Saxony entered on the same terms as Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Bavaria, and Württemberg. In some instances, however, the terms of negotiated by different states were not precisely the same, even if the general outlines of membership were the similar. For instance, Hesse-Cassel obtained privileges for the Cassel fair, whereas Hesse-Darmstadt did not receive similar rights for its own fair. Further, states sometimes tried to participate in discussions together with Prussia concerning the entry of new member states. For details on this on other agreements, see Henderson (1939, 81-82, 86-87) .
the relative importance of Frankfurt as a larger city.
14 It also allowed trade in manufacturing goods from Frankfurt up the Main River to Northern Bavaria in exchange for grain without paying customs duties. Figure 4 shows the German Zollverein in the year 1836. 15 The Zollverein has been credited for promoting Germany's industrialization by achieving a high degree of integration among the Zollverein states, but the effect of the Zollverein on longrun growth has been much debated. Henderson (1939, 339) have reduced the time until a particular city (or area) became part of the railway network that was built in Germany after 1835. Second, the Zollverein may also have contributed to monetary integration among member states, as exchange rates were fixed among member states by the year 1838, soon after the creation of the Zollverein (see Bissing 1959) .
Under the centralized management of Prussia, the Zollverein may have been more efficient at organizing tariff regulation and collection, at least compared to many small states 14 Prussia, for example, traded about twice as much with Frankfurt as it did with England or Austria, and about four times as much as with France in the early 1820s (Ohnishi 1973, 143) . 15 Other notable accessions to the Zollverein before the political unification of Germany, in the year 1871, include Braunschweig (1841), Hanover (1851), Oldenburg (1852), Schleswig-Holstein (1866), and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, as well as Lübeck in 1868. 16 See also Pollard (1981, 159) , who describes how the Zollverein was important for German development and subsequent industrialization because it helped achieve a large unified Empire, economically and politically. Bazillion (1990, 192) suggests that modernization quickened its pace in Saxony due to access to newly-opened markets after the Zollverein came into existence. each monitoring its own borders. Lee (1988) and Dumke (1991 Dumke ( , 1977 tend to view the revenue sharing function as the primary economic legacy of the Zollverein, concluding that economic union played a limited role in promoting regional long-run development.
17
Still unresolved, however, is whether the external tariffs changed the level of protection that German industries had during pre-Zollverein times. Notably, Prussia's revenues also decreased between 1834 and 1838 when the Zollverein was first introduced (Henderson 1939, 140) .
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Similarities can be drawn between the arguments in this debate in the context of the Zollverein and those in the literature on the effect of tariffs on economic growth in other countries of the past and present.
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For the specific case of agricultural products, the key restrictions on trade before the customs union often took the form of export tariffs, including partial border closures.
20
When bad harvests led to rising local prices, the government could take measures to discourage grain exports.
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These measures were at the government's discretion, typically staggered, and depended upon the degree of price increase. Seiffert (1893) reports that in one instance in late 18 th century Bavaria, the government increased the export duties and introduced a new export permit.
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As prices rose further, the government completely prohibited grain exports, and also 17 Lee (1988, p. 351) states, "The customs union did not fundamentally affect the existing dynamic of early German industrialization; not only were inner German trade links well established before 1834, despite the persistence of internal trade barriers, but the beginning of the long-term growth of German trade can be assigned with some certainty to the mid-1820s, a full decade before the establishment of the Zollverein." 18 In 1834, Prussia's receipts were 22.5% less than what it was in 1833 (20 silver groschens per head in 1834 and 15.5 silver groschens per head in 1933), and reached former levels only in 1838 (Henderson 1939, 141-2) . In other German states, Zollverein membership appears to have increased tariff revenues considerably; see, e.g., Hahn (1982) who shows that tariff revenue rose in Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau when these states joined the Zollverein, both in absolute terms as well as a share of total revenues (Hahn 1982, Tables 2-5; pp. 317-327) . 19 See for example, Harley (1992) on the contribution of tariffs for the evolution of the textile industry in 18 th century America, O'Rourke (2000), and Irwin (2002 Irwin ( , 2000 on the impact of tariffs in the late 19 th century. 20 In the case of Bavaria, grain export in the early 19 th century also entailed additional fees (Seiffert 1893, 886) . See also Gailus (1994, 188) . 21 Berger and Spoerer (2001) have recently argued that the degree of price shocks in the bad harvest years of 1845/47 can in part explain in which countries the revolutionary movements of 1848 were particularly pronounced. 22 Increases in export duties varied: an additional 48 Kreuzer by ship, 32 Kreuzer over land. eliminated the usually required consumption tax on imported grain. During extreme food crises, the smuggling of grain out of the country was punishable by death (Seiffert 1893, 887) .
The governments' interventions after the Zollverein was created may still have curtailed the extent of intra-German trade, but Prussia in the 1840s was also a relatively antiinterventionist government compared to its stance before the 1820s. Some of the measures were merely gestures intended to quell food riots.
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For instance, the prohibition against the export of potatoes outside the Zollverein had little significance since potatoes were not generally suitable for export anyway (Gailus 1994, 188) . In addition, as noted in Seuffert (1857, Introduction), these measures were often ineffective in preventing the prices from rising, in part because in response merchants would withhold grain from the markets, leading to a rise in grain prices.
It is reasonable to expect that the impact of the customs union was to increase integration in the German regions. The price studies of Kopsidis (2002 Kopsidis ( , 1998 and Bass (1991) , which use simple correlation as well as co-integration techniques to analyze the integration of agricultural markets in German regions in the 19 th century, provide evidence that this was the case. Kopsidis (1998), for instance, finds that Westphalian rye markets became increasingly integrated between 1780 and 1880. Moreover, a major part of the overall increase in integration in Westphalia appears to have occurred only after 1850, and may be traced to the extension of the railway network after 1844. If this is the case, then railway construction was likely to have had the same influence on market integration in other German regions over the primary period of railway construction, 1835 to 1885. Other authors, however, place less emphasis on railways. Fremdling and Hohorst (1979) , for example, find that a substantial part of the advancement in market integration in the German rye market occurred already by 1820, leaving a less prominent role for changes in the degree of market integration and the railways that came later in the 19 th 23 Gailus, (1990, 328, 335-6, 341). century.
I now turn to the data that will be used in the analysis.
Data sources and characteristics
This paper uses price data to study the development of markets. As barriers to trade fall, arbitrage between markets will bring price differences down, until in the limit the law of one price (LOP) holds. In this framework, relatively small deviations from LOP are consistent with a relatively high level of market integration, and vice versa. At least two forms of trade barriers can be distinguished: first, transport costs as they relate to the value-to-weight ratio of goods as they are moved over some geographic distance. Second, tariffs, taxes, and fees of various kinds that relate to border crossings from one to state to another state. While my analysis encompasses both types of barriers, the focus is on how the elimination of customs borders affected trade as evidenced by changes in the price gaps between markets. I will also touch on trade barriers more broadly defined. Language differences, for instance, are frequently correlated with geographic distance.
The main source of information on prices of German states used in this study is Seuffert's (1857) analysis of monthly market prices for four types of grains-wheat, rye, barley, and oatsin Bavarian cities for the years 1815 to 1855. Specifically, I use data on wheat prices in Bavaria's core region east of the Rhine as well as for Zweibrücken, located non-contiguously in the Bavarian Palatinate area (see Figure 1 ).
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The original source for this data are 'Schrannenzettel' ('Schranne' is the Bavarian word for markets), which are records of the proceedings on a giving market day by public officials. These data are therefore similar to the so-called mercuriales in the French-speaking part of Europe.
The Seuffert source lists the average price ('Mittelpreis') of all market days in a month (typically the Saturdays), as well as the quantities offered and sold. The quantity units are in Bavarian Schäffel (1 Schäffel wheat is about 223 liters in volume), and the monetary units are in Bavarian Gulden and Kreuzer (1 Gulden = 60 Kreuzer). The source does not give specific information on the quality of the grain that was offered at a particular market in a particular month, but it is fair to assume that the average price would be paid for mid-quality wheat. 25 The price series are highly complete and seem to be very reliable, 26 a fact that has been noted by other researchers. 27 Seuffert also provides annual prices for markets in Baden, Württemberg, Frankfurt, Prussia, and Switzerland. In the early 19 th century, these states would typically use both different currencies and different quantity units. Such differences will often make absolute price comparisons difficult, but here I can use all relevant conversion rates (reported in Seuffert 1857, 351) . This data is complemented with market prices for grain for certain markets in Austria and in France (from Pribram 1938 and Drame et al. 1991, respectively) . 28 Summary statistics for the prices are given in Table 1 . The 26 cities in the sample provide a total of 944 annual observations. Average bilateral distance between two cities is about 337 kilometers. Markets locations with city names are shown in Figure 5 . 29 Geographically, wheat prices in Europe tend to increase as one moves further to the North and to the West.
Empirical analysis
Spatial correlation in the Bavarian market for wheat
As noted earlier, I examine the evolution of market integration in Germany by explicitly incorporating spatial features. First and foremost, these are the geographic distances between the grain markets. In order to get an idea on which markets in Bavaria were relatively well connected and which were not, it is useful to consider measures of spatial correlation across markets. Geary's (1954) statistic of global spatial correlation has recently been extended by Anselin (1995) to encapsulate a local measure of autocorrelation. Omitting the time subscript for readability, for city i and a given spatial lag k, the local Geary measure is defined as
where for any city i, i p is the log of its price for wheat and N is the size of the sample (N=14 in core Bavaria). The
is an indicator variable that equals one if the distance between cities i and j falls in the distance class k, and zero otherwise. The statistic is seen to be a quadratic in 29 The figure, as well as my analysis, associates each state with a city. In five cases I have only information on the state-wide average price (for Baden, Württemberg, and the Prussian provinces of Saxony, Westphalia, and Rhine province). If there is a significant amount of within-state price dispersion (e.g. prices in the hilly areas of Württemberg's Black Forest are higher than in the capital, Stuttgart), this may lead to higher measurement error. I have experimented with different samples and found that this has no major effect on my results. Note that Figure 5 does not show Bar-le-Duc and Chalon-sur-Marne, two French cities to the west of Luneville. 30 For instance, I will consider below the distance class (0, 200), so that ) ( k ij δ is equal to 1 if the distance between i and j is between 0 and 200 km, and 0 otherwise. the cities' price differences in distance class k relative to the overall variance. All else equal, the smaller the price gaps for a given distance class, the lower the Geary statistic and the higher is the degree of spatial correlation for these distances. Other factors determine the extent of spatial correlation as well. Würzburg, for instance, exhibits a relatively low Geary value even though it is located in the Northwest corner of Bavaria. This can be in part explained by its location on the Main River (see Figure 7 , which shows the rivers), which lowers the unit transport costs. Würzburg is the Bavarian 'exit portal' to the large downstream city of Frankfurt, and it is also connected by water transport route to other Bavarian markets. Indeed, spatial correlation on average is higher for river cities than for non-river cities.
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This parallels the results for 18 th century China obtained in Keller and Shiue (2004, forthcoming) .
The interpretation of a high spatial correlation as evidence for relatively good market integration depends on which geographic distance is considered. Take for example Lindau, located in the Southwest of Bavaria. For distances of up to 100 km, Lindau has the highest spatial correlation of all 14 cities, while for all distances it has the lowest degree of spatial correlation. Lindau receives much of its grain from two nearby cities (Kempten and 31 The Geary statistics are 0.71 and 0.79 for river and non-river cities, respectively. Memmingen), and exports a substantial amount of it to neighboring Switzerland, where prices tend to be higher than in Bavaria. This explains Lindau's high spatial correlation for short distances. At the same time, Lindau is relatively far away from other Bavarian cities (and with prices being relatively high, Lindau rarely exports grain to other Bavarian cities), which explains its low overall market integration as indicated by the high Geary statistic for all distances.
Changes in spatial correlation over time
Spatial correlation increased in Bavaria over these roughly forty years, with the local While these results appear to be temporary, they suggest that customs borders might have important effects on the evolution of market integration. In the following, the importance of customs borders as a deterrent for trade is examined by using data on grain prices not only in Bavaria, but also in other German states as well as Austria, Switzerland, and France.
Border effects
I now ask whether the borders between German states in pre-Zollverein times appear to have significantly restricted trade, and if so, to quantify this effect. As noted above, the creation of the Zollverein was a gradual process; however, two years stand out as being particularly important: the year of 1834, when the (augmented) Prussian Customs Union joined with the South German Customs Union, the Kingdom of Saxony, and the Thuringian Customs Union to 32 To use the terminology of Viner (1950) 34 The German states were economically diverse (see Tipton 1976 on regional development in Germany) and states' characteristics played a critical role in determining when and whether to join the union. See for example, Henderson (1939, 103-127) on the context in which individual states decided to join the Zollverein. 35 Several languages were spoken in either of these countries, but in the cities that I focus on, Rorschach and Vienna, it was predominantly German. second round in 1836. As discussed by Henderson (1939) , there was not much difference in terms of the conditions at which the German states joined the Prussia-dominated Zollverein.
Given that, it is plausible to assume that if endogeneity played a role in the timing of when the German states joined the Zollverein, the states that expected a higher relative gain were the ones that joined first. Thus, if endogeneity along these lines is important, one should estimate a stronger border effect from the 1834 round than from the 1836 round of joining the Zollverein. I will look for this effect below.
The regression specification that is employed is the following:
where ij dist is the geographic distance between market i and market j (measured in 100s of kilometers), the variable ijt border is equal to 1 if for year t there was no border between i and j, and zero otherwise, ' cc α is a bilateral country pair specific effect, and ε ijt is a mean-zero but possibly heteroskedastic error term. by examining whether a direct trade route between i and j in year t had to pass through one or 36 The inclusion of α cc' means that the price gap is allowed to vary for a German-German and German-Swiss pair, for example, even before the Zollverein eliminated the customs border for the German-German pair. more customs borders. Table 2 shows the results. In the upper part, the sample consists of those bilateral relations for which the customs border fell away in 1834 (border before 1834 = 0, border after 1834 = 1) versus those for which the customs border did not fall away during the years 1815-55 (border before 1834 = 0, border after 1834 = 0). The coefficient γ on border measures thus the average change in the price gap as two states become Zollverein members in 1834, relative to the change among two states that did not become members of the same customs union in 1834.
Recall that in 1834, the 'action' was relative to Saxony and Prussia. The difference-in-difference (or "double difference") estimator is defined as the difference in average outcome of pairs where there was a change in border (for example, Würzburg (Bavaria) and Frankfurt) minus the difference in average outcome in those pairs where there was no change in the border in 1834.
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As a baseline, specification (1) introduces the distance variable by itself. The coefficient suggests that doubling the distance is on average associated with a 0.093 higher price gap. Specification (2) includes the border variable; its coefficient γ is -0.046, significantly less than zero. This means that price gaps have fallen with the elimination of Zollverein borders, which is consistent with a border effect.
Another way of looking at the size of the border effect is to ask what the implied border effect is in terms of distance, or, how much of an increase in distance is equivalent to the customs border being eliminated? This is the distance commonly known as the border-width, and is here equal to 156 kilometers (km): the presence of the border is thus effectively equivalent to adding 156 km to the distance that would have to be traveled without border.
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There is the possibility that German states were intrinsically more likely to join the Zollverein than non-German states/entities, for instance due to language reasons. If this were the case, the estimate of -0.046 would likely be an overestimate for non-German speaking states. In order to examine this possibility, in the following I estimate the border effect separately from German-and non-German speaking control groups.
In specification (3), the border effect is identified from cities in Germany-Germany pairs versus cities in Germany-France pairs, whereas in specification (4), the comparison is between Germany-Germany and Germany-Switzerland/Austria pairs. The border coefficient γ varies little between the two specifications. This in itself suggests that the border effect from specification (2) might not be biased in a particular direction. At the same time, the implied border width for the German-speaking pairs is estimated to be 162 km, while the width is 144 km for the different language pairs in Germany and France.
The fact that the point estimate of the border effect for Germany-France (in specification (3)) is about 11% smaller than that for Germany-Austria/Switzerland (in specification (4)) could mean that heterogeneity might play a role in determining the size of these border effects. If, in addition, common language is correlated with other important differences between city pairs, the estimated border effect might reflect how large those effects are as well. The results suggest that eliminating a border reduces trade costs equivalent to about 160 km if the economies are quite similar and equivalent to about 140 km if they are somewhat less similar to each other. If there 38 This is computed as follows: in specification (2) the elimination of borders means on average a 0.046 lower price gap, while the point estimate for distance is 0.094. Engel and Rogers (1996) suggest that given the concavity of the natural log function, it might be better to use the upper 95% confidence interval estimate for distance, which is 0.104. I adopt this approach here as well. Then, the implied border width in terms of distance is the
Here, ln(dist*) is 0.442, or dist* = 1.56. Distance is measured in hundreds of kilometers, so that the implied border width is 156 kilometers; this figure is reported in Table 2 , specification (2).
were no important other differences between the French and the Swiss or Austrian cities in the sample, the difference between these estimates may provide an estimate for the influence of language on trade in early 19 th century Europe: if the same language is spoken, trade is around 11% higher than if languages are different in the two cities, according to these estimates.
The lower part of Table 2 The coefficient on border in (6) is significantly negative at -0.041-and is similar to the estimate of -0.046 in specification (2) for the 1834 round. The border coefficients identified from the two smaller samples are -0.047 in specification (7) and -0.049 in (8) for the Germany-France and the Germany-Switzerland/Austria samples, respectively. The implied border width is again about 150 km (see (6)). Also here the estimates suggest that in terms of distance-equivalents, the border elimination was more effective for German-speaking cities than for mixed-language pairs, with the difference being a bit larger than before (152 kilometers versus 177 kilometers, respectively, or 15%). Overall, however, the results for these two Zollverein rounds are very similar.
So far I have quantified the border effect by expressing it in terms of kilometers of distance (the "Implied border width" rows in Table 2 ). An alternative way to estimate the importance of borders is to examine the fraction of the price gap was accounted for by borders.
In fact, this may be the preferred measure for doing so, for at least two reasons: first, it is the price gap (i.e., the extent of the deviation of the LOP) that is our primary indicator of arbitrage and market integration, and thus one may want to express the 'size' of the border in terms of that gap.
Second, calculating the border effect in terms of the price gap is particularly useful when making comparisons over long periods of time, as I will do in section 4.5 below. This is because the cost of transporting grain over a distance of say 200 km has become much lower since the Table 3 .
According to specification (2), the price gap falls by 0.046 when the border vanishes.
The mean absolute price gap is 0.155, so the border effect accounts 29.7% of that. The mean log distance is 1.334, which with a distance coefficient of 0.094 means that on average distance adds 0.125, or 80.9% to the price gap. In the 1836 Zollverein round, the elimination of the border accounts for 22.4% of the mean price gap between cities (0.041 over 0.183, the mean of the dependent variable), whereas on average distance accounts for 53.9% of the price gap.
To compare the relative sizes of border and distance effects, the last row of Table 3 shows the "Relative Border Effects", defined as the ratio of the border effect on price and the distance effect on price. The relative border effect is 36.7% for the 1834 Zollverein round, and it is equal to 41.6% for the 1836 Zollverein round. These results suggest that on average, distance appears to have been a more important obstacle to the equalization of prices than borders were at the time.
What do these results say about endogeneity? Is there evidence that the regions that became Zollverein members were a self-selected group in the sense that they benefited more in terms of trade and arbitrage than a randomly chosen city would have? If that would be the case, one would expect that the benefits from joining the Zollverein are greater for the early-joiners than for the later-joiners, for the very reason that the former group has joined earlier than the latter. One might be concerned that the two rounds of Zollverein accession are only two years apart, which could mean that the sequence of accession does in fact not mean anything.
However, it is clear from the history of the Zollverein creation that the sequence of accession is in fact indicative of which state expected a relatively high benefits-to-costs ratio, and which state did not.
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Consistent with the endogeneity argument, I estimate a slightly higher border effect equivalent distance for the early joiners (1834 group) than for the later-joiners (1836 group), with 156 km versus 149 km (see Table 2 , specifications (2) and (6)). At the same time, I
estimate that on average, the elimination of the border did relatively more for reducing the price gaps in the 1836 round than in the 1834 round: the relative border effect is estimated at 41.6% in the 1836 round, but only 36.7% in the 1834 round (Table 3) . This is the opposite of what we would expect if the 1834 group endogenously entered the Zollverein earlier based on the belief that the customs union would given them a larger relative gain compared to what the non-joiners could expect. There does not appear to be a clear pattern that would be consistent with an endogeneity problem. Overall, this suggests that it is unlikely that these border effect estimates are strongly affected by the endogenous choice of states to join the Zollverein.
In the following section, I examine the dynamics associated with border effects in the aftermath of customs union formation.
The Dynamics of Border Effects
I have just discussed the economic interpretation of the border effect, based on the estimate of γ (approximately -0.04 in all specifications) shown in Table 2 . In addition, I ask whether the size of the border effect has exhibited any dynamics after the Zollverein rounds. In particular, did it become stronger over time? Or was there a dramatic effect right after the liberalization, but little change thereafter? A priori, it is not clear what one should expect. These issues are not addressed in the specifications in Table 2 since these specifications identify an average border effect over a period of 20 or 22 years: for the years 1836-55 in the 1836 Zollverein round, and for the years 1834-55 in the 1834 Zollverein round, respectively.
In the following, therefore, I allow for the border effect to vary by subperiod. Three different specifications are shown in Table 4 , both for the 1834 and for the 1836 Zollverein round. In the top part (specification I), the estimated border effect is allowed to vary across five subperiods of four to five years each. Below (specification II), I estimate a short-run border effect for the first six years, a medium-run effect for the next six years, and the long-run effect for the remainder years in the sample. At the bottom of Table 4 (specification III), I distinguish only the short-run from the long-run effect (roughly the first and the second decade after elimination of the customs borders).
Overall, the dynamics for the two Zollverein rounds are similar, and they suggest that the strength of the border effect has increased over time (for the 1836 round, this effect is monotonic). For instance, the parameter γ is -0.043 during the years 1834/37 and -0. 
The Size of the Border Effect Compared
How large is this effect in comparison to other estimates? Table 3 summarizes my results and compares them to those of Engel and Rogers (1996) , a highly influential paper that estimates border effects between U.S. and Canadian cities for the years 1978 and 1994. Before proceeding, it is important to note how their approach differs from what I have presented above.
First, Engel and Rogers (1996) estimate border effects for the relative LOP by studying the volatility of the two-month change in relative prices between cities. The authors have access only to price indices data, rather than product level price data, so they estimate border effects as a deviation from the relative law of one price. Estimates of the absolute LOP are generally preferable if product level data is available, as they are here, so I focus on that. 40 Second, Engel and Rogers (1996) estimate their border effects for a diverse set of goods and services ranging from medical care to footwear to alcoholic beverages. Some of these are highly differentiated goods, and others are non-tradables, both of which are likely to face additional barriers that prevent arbitrage compared to wheat, the good under analysis here.
A third difference lies in the fact that Engel and Rogers (1996) identify their border effect with data from U.S. and Canadian cities only from cross-sectional variation-the U.S.-Canadian border existed throughout their sample period-whereas my analysis uses both time series and cross-sectional variation.
The preferred estimate of Engel and Rogers for the border effect in terms of distance is 2,848 kilometers, considerably larger than what I estimate here (see Table 3 for a comparison).
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When one computes the border effect not in terms of distance, but rather in terms of price behavior, my border effect estimates are also smaller than those of Engel and Rogers: according to my estimates, the relative border effect on price is about 40%, whereas Engel and Rogers estimate it to be about 160% (see Table 3 , last row). This means that the relative importance of border and distance are reversed in my and in Engel and Rogers' research. How much of that is due to the fact that Engel and Rogers study the relative LOP using monthly data, whereas my regressions examine the absolute LOP using annual data? I have used a subset of my sample for which monthly data is available, together with their methods in order to shed some light on that.
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The border effect using Engel and Rogers-type methods is 149 km in the years 1825-33, and it is 121 km in the years 1837-55. The implied border width using these numbers is thus about 130 km. Border effects account for 7% and 4.4%, respectively, of the mean volatility of the price gap, while distance explains 25.5% and 35.8%. Thus, the differences in research design-especially absolute versus relative LOP-between Engel and Rogers' and my study do not appear to be of major importance in explaining why I estimate relatively small border effects for the 19 th century, compared to their 20 th century estimates.
In part, the differences in terms of results may indeed have to do with the homogeneous versus differentiated goods characteristics that are analyzed in the two studies. At least as important, however, appears to be the identification issue. It may well be that the size of the border effect is overestimated if there is no time series variation that can identify it. Future research may be needed to fully settle these issues. At this point, I note that the border effects 42 Specifically, using monthly prices on France and Bavaria, I estimate the width of the border by looking at the standard deviation of the difference in the log of the relative price between time t and t-2 as the measure of the relative price in location j relative to the price in location k; this corresponds closely to the method used in Engel and Rogers (1996) .
Conclusions
The border changes that occurred under the Zollverein provide a unique opportunity for understanding border effects because not just a few, but a sizeable number of states decided to join (or not join) the union. This provides a large number of bilateral observations with which to study the border effect. This paper uses prices in France, Switzerland, the Habsburg Empire of Austria, and fifteen Bavarian cities for the years 1815 to 1855 to assess the size of border effects in the context of the German Zollverein. Local indicators of spatial association show that within Bavaria, cities near the center (Nürnberg, Augsburg, and Landshut) are more highly integrated than cities in the sample's periphery. In the years immediately subsequent to the Zollverein liberalization rounds of 1834 and 1836, cities closest to the newly opened border became more integrated with these trade partners. At the same time, those cities located further away from the newly opened border may have seen a slight reduction in their trade integration, an effect that suggests the presence of trade diversion. Both effects, trade creation and trade diversion, appear to be temporary.
The main result of my analysis is that the estimated border effects for Europe in the early to mid-19 th century are small compared to estimates using contemporary data. For the 1834 liberalization round, the implied border effect, calculated as the implied decrease in distance that comes about as the result of the customs border being eliminated, is between 140 and 160 kilometers, with the smaller distance for non-German speaking cities, and the larger distance for German speaking cities. Thus, common language in our sample provides for an additional benefit of lowering trade barriers by 11%, making border elimination more valuable among German-speaking cities than for mixed-language speaking cities.
In addition, the results suggest that the border effect for early joiners to the Zollverein was not substantially different from that for late joiners. For both rounds, the Zollverein effects become stronger over time, consistent with future paths of market integration being in part shaped by Zollverein membership-and that may have been especially true because of both railway building and monetary integration.
One reason border width estimates in the historical sample are not as large as that found in contemporary samples may be because this calculation depends on the size of the distance effect. Overall trading possibilities in the 19 th century were more constrained in the first instance by virtue of distance, whereas trade today is less constrained by distance. Where the width of the border depends on the distance effect, the former will be magnified by the extent of the latter. This cannot be the only explanation, however, since I still estimate smaller border effects in terms of its effect on price directly when no distance effect is involved (see Table 3 ). It is very likely that another reason for the relatively small border effect estimate found in this paper is that the analysis uses a difference-in-difference approach. Thus, I compare the difference in outcomes before and after the Zollverein for Zollervein members with the before and after of a comparison group of non-Zollverein members. The border effect, as it is often estimated, does not focus on the periods when borders changed, nor does it explicitly compare the border effect pairs with control group pairs. Instead, a large and unspecific number of intercountry differences appear to be captured in the estimate, which may lead to the border width being overstated. All regressions include fixed effects for each country pair Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses ** (*) indicates significantly different from zero at a 1% (5%) level *** Computed from distance coefficient at upper 95% confidence interval; c.f. Engel/Rogers (1996) Relative Border Effect***** 36.7 41.6 159.6 (%) * 2848 kilometers = 1780 miles ** Computation: see text *** Border coefficient divided by average of left-hand side variable for cross-border pairs **** Distance coefficient times average log distance over average of left-hand side variable, both for cross-border pairs ***** Border Effect on Price divided by Distance Effect on Price List of Figures   Figure 1 The German Confederation around 1820 ("Der Deutsche Bund nach dem Frankfurter Territorialrezess um 1820")
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